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IN THE SUP·REME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
I ETHEL M. GIBBONS, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
OREM CITY CORPORATION, 
and GARY SCOTT CRAWFORD, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
Case No. 
12476 
RESPO·NDENTS' BRIEF 
NATURE OF CASE 
This is an action against Orem City Corporation and 
its employee. Plaintiff claims property damage and per-
sonal injury which allegedly resulted from a collision be-
tween plaintiff's automobile and a vehicle owned by de-
fendant Orem City and driven by its employee, defendant 
Gary Scott Crawford. 
Plaintiff alleges that the driver of defendant's ve-
hicle was negligent in his operation of said vehicle. De-
fendant denied its driver's negligence, and alleged that 
plaintiff's negligence proximately contributed to her 
damage and injuries, barring her recovery. 
1 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The District Court for Utah County granted defend. 
I 
ants' motion for summary judgment and judgment was j 
entered in favor of defendants upon the grounds that , 
plaintiff was contributorily negligent as a matter of law, ' 
which was a proximate contributing cause of her dam. 
age. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The respondents seek an affirmation of the trial 
court's decision. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On October 7, 1968 at approximately 12:50 p.m. 
plaintiff, Ethel M. Gibbons, was driving her automobile 
south on State Street in Orem, Utah, with May Soren 
son, deceased, as her passenger. As plaintiff's automo· 
bile approached the intersection of State Street and State 
Road 52 she drove into the left turn lane and stopped, in 
compliance with the semaphore light which was red for 
south bound traffic. When the semaphore light she was 
facing changed to green, plaintiff attempted to make a left 
turn into the path of the north bound traffic facing her, 
which traffic included the Orem City truck driven by the 
defendant, Gary Scott Crawford. Plaintiff failed to see de· 
fencfnt's truck and another vehicle driven by witness 
Boyd Erickson, both of which were north bound, and her i 
automobile and defendant Orem City's truck collided in I 
said intersection. 
1 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
PLAINTIFF WAS CONTRIBUTORILY NEGLIGENT 
AS A MATTER OF LAW. 
A. IN FAILING TO KEEP A PROPER LOOK-
OUT. 
Plaintiff testified in her deposition that she did not 
see defendant Orem City's truck prior to the collison. Her 
restmony is quoted as follows: 
Q. You were stopped waiting for the light to 
change from red to green? 
A. Yes. 
Q. The question is were there any other cars on 
the opposite side of the intersection headed 
in a northerly direction or opposite from your 
car? Do you follow me? 
A. There was no one in my lane of traffic, I guess 
I could say. 
Q. I didn't make myself clear. You were stopped, 
your car would be facing south waiting to 
make a left hand turn to go east, were you 
not? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And you were waiting for the light to change 
from red to green. Now were there any other 
cars on the opposite side of the intersection 
also waiting for the light to change that you 
remember? 
A. I do not remember. I knew that there was no 
one obstructing my lane of traffic. 
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Q. You intended to make a left hand turn to 
go east, did you not? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Up towards Heber City? 
A. Yes. 
Q. After the light changed you started to make 
your left hand turn, is that right? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did you see any vehicles come ino the inter· 
section going north which might interfere 
with your path or the path your car was 
going? 
A. I did not. 
Q. Did you see the truck which struck your car 
before the collision occurred? 
A. I did not. 
Q. Then your first notice that an accident was 
happening was when a truck hit your car, is 
that right? 
A. Struck my car. 
Q. You didn't see the truck before it struck your 
car? 
A. No, indeed. If you will excuse me I had made 
that turn many,many times before. 
(Plaintiff's deposition, page 7, beginning with line 
7 and continuing to and including line 15, page 8). (Em· 
phasis added). 
During questioning by her attorney plaintiff sim· 
ilarly testified as follows: 
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Q. You were headed in a south and easterly di-
rection to make a left turn, is that right? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Where did you look in the course of making 
that turn, or did you have your eyes closed? 
A. No, I didn't have my eyes closed, never when 
I was driving a car. 
Q. Go ahead, tell us where you looked? 
A. I looked in the direction which I was going, 
east. 
Q. Did you look in any other direction? 
A. And I looked in the direction to the right 
of me to see that there was no one coming 
that would be in front of me. 
Q. Would that be to the west? 
A. No, that would be watching for the traffic 
coming from the south, if I remember my di-
rections right. 
Q. Did you see any coming from the south? 
A. I never saw anyone. They told me that is 
where the truck came from, but I did not see 
him. I did not see him. 
(Plaintiff's deposition beginning with line 27, page 
18 and continuing to and including line 15, page 19). 
rnmphasis added). 
In her own affidavit which is dated subsequent to 
her deposition, plaintiff reiterates that she did not see 
the approaching traffic: 
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. . . I never saw the truck that hit me. My 
blinker signal was on for my left turn. I had 
looked to the south to see if any traffic was coming 
from the south. I saw no traffic coming in mi· 
direction and proceeded with my turn .... (R. 
141). 
It should be noted that plaintiff herself never stated 
in her deposition or affidavit that her view was obstructed 
in any way. Instead she testified that she did not see de· 
fendant's vehicle until impact and that she saw no traffic 
coming in her direction. 
The only suggestion that plaintiff's view of defend· 
ant's vehicle was in some way obstructed is made by plain-
tiff's attorney in their brief, on page six. There they 
affirmatively state, without supporting evidence, that 1 
the position of Mr. Boyd Erickson's car obscured defend-
ant's dump truck and that plaintiff could not see the truck 
because of the Erickson car. 
Later, on page seven of plaintiff's brief, it is claimed 
that the skid marks of defendant's truck shown in the 
photographs show that the defendant driver would have 
been able to see "out over a passenger car such as the 
Erickson vehicle." On one page plaintiff says that her 
view was probably obstructed. However, on the follow-
ing page she claims that the defendant truck driver could 
have seen over that very obstruction. It would seem fair 
to conclude that if the defendant driver could see the 
plaintiff, then the plaintiff could also see the defendant. 
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The law has been clearly established in this state 
that a motorist who makes a left hand turn in the face of 
oncoming traffic, on a busy highway, must exercise rea-
sonable care to be aware of the position of approaching 
vehicles, their speeds, and must appraise the situation as 
to whether said turn can be made safely. Budge# vs. Yeates, 
122 Utah 518, 252 P2d 220; Hickok vs. Skinner, 113 Utah 
l, 190 P2d 514; French vs. Utah Oil Refinery Co., 117 
Utah 406, 216 P2d 1002; Cederloff vs. Whited, 110 Utah 
45, 169 P2d 777; Gren vs. Norton, 117 Utah 121, 213 
P2d 356. 
The case of Smith vs. Gallegos, 16 Utah 2d 344, 400 
P2d 5 70 ( 1965) is clearly distinguishable on its facts from 
the case at bar. In that case the plaintiff testified that he 
pulled into the left hand turn lane, signalled his turn, 
that as he was stopped he noticed cars in the northbound 
turn lane, that when the light turned green and the ve-
hicles started to turn west, he checked and "everything 
was clear as far as he could see", that he was almost across 
the intersection when he saw the head lights of the de-
fndant' s truck "bearing down on him." The evidence 
showed the defendant Gallegos had been northbound on 
the inside lane, and as he approached the intersection, 
pulled into the outside lane around other northbound 
cars at an accelerated rate of speed. 
In this instance plaintiff on a clear day, saw no ve-
hicles, not even the Erickson car which was forced to 
make an abrupt stop to avoid a collision. 
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The case of Hardman vs. Thurman, 121 Utah 143, 
239 P2d 215, cited by plaintiff also involved a different 
fact situation. In that case plaintiff was making a left 
hand turn to go east through the intersection of State 
Street and 21st South Street in Salt Lake City. When the 
light turned green she stopped to permit northbound 
traffic to proceed through the intersection. There was a 
truck making a left hand turn from the inside lane, an-
other vehicle in the middle northbound lane had stopped 
to permit plaintiff to make the turn, under those circum-
stances she was clearly justified in assuming defendant's 
truck would also stop and yield her the right of way. 
Contra to the plaintiff in the case at bar, she made a care· 
ful appraisal of the situation and did not continue with 
her left hand turn until it became apparent northbound 
traffic had yielded her the right of way. 
From plaintiff's own testimony the evidence is con· 
elusive that she did not see nor make any attempt to see 
approaching traffic which was there to be seen. 
B. FAILING TO YIELD THE RIGHT OF WAY 
IN VIOLATION OF 41-6-73 UTAH CODE ANNOTAT-
ED. 
The Utah statute controlling right of way where one 
driver is making a left turn reads as follows: 
The driver of a vehicle within an intersection in· 
tending to turn to the left shall yield the right .of 
way to any vehicle approaching from the opposite 
direction which is within the intersection or so 
close thereto as to constitute an immediate hazard, 
during the time when such driver is moving with· 
in the intersection. 
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The affidavits of witness Boyd Erickson and defend-
ant Gary Scott Crawford establish that their vehicles were 
each so close as to constitute an immediate hazard to plain-
tiff making a left turn through the intersection. In de-
fendant Gary Scott Crawford's affidavit he states that he 
first observed plaintiff's automobile as it moved into his 
lane of traffic making a left turn. (R. 57). He estimates 
the distance separating the two vehicles at 70 to 75 feet. 
(R. 57). He detected no evasive action by plaintiff. (R. 
57). He further states that plaintiff and her passenger 
appeared to be talking to each other just prior to the 
collision. (R. 57). 
The affidavit of witness Boyd Erickson (R. 61) states 
that he was north bound on State Street and 800 North 
(State Road 52) when he witnessed the collision between 
plaintiff's and defendant's vehicles. As he approached the 
red semaphore he braked almost to a stop. When he was 
almost stopped, the semaphore changed from red to green 
for northbound traffic. He then proceeded into the inter-
section. He testified as follows: 
When I was almost completely stopped, the sem-
aphore changed to green in my direction and I 
therefore proceeded into the intersection when a 
Ford automobile coming from the north and lo-
cated in the turn lane provided for south bound 
traffic made a sudden left turn immediately in 
front of me. The driver apparently intended to 
drive east through the intersection onto 8th North. 
When the driver commenced the turn, I was al-
ready in the intersection and I had to make an 
abrupt stop to avoid hitting this automobile even 
though I had almost stopped at the inersection. 
Just at the time that I was stopped to avert making 
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conact with the Ford automobile, I heard brakes 
screeching to my right and rear. I had no idea of 
what caused this noise because I was observing 
the Ford automobile in front of me and did not 
observe the source of the screeching brakes until 
a dump truck skidded past me on my right and 
cdlided with the Ford automobit! in the intersec· 
tion. The dump truck made contact with the right 
side of the Ford vehicle and moved the Ford some 
distance to the north. The dump truck drove past 
me in the lane immediately to my right. I do not 
recall detecting any indications made by the driver 
of the Ford vehicle that a left turn was intended. 
As I approached the particular intersection the 
Ford vehicle was stopped in the far left lane of the 
southbound traffic. Only when the light turned 
green did that vehicle commence to make the 
abrupt left turn into the intersection. The driver 
of the Ford vehicle undertook no evasive action 
which was apparent to me prior to the impact. 
(R. 61-62). 
Plaintiff's testimony does not contradict these state· 
ments since she admitted that she did not see defendant's 
truck prior to the impact. With reference to the vehicle 
driven by witness Boyd Erickson, plaintiff was asked in 
her deposition if there were any other cars on the oppo· 
ie side of the intersection waiting to proceed north. Plain· 
tiff answered: "I do not remember". (p. 7 of plaintiff's 
deposition). Plaintiff further stated that she looked for 
traffic coming from the south but "I never saw anyone". 
(p. 19 of plaintiff's deposition). As referred to above, 
plaintiff also looked to the south but saw no traffic com· 
ing in her direction. (R. 141). 
Without contradiction by plaintiff's own testimonr 
or evidence, the testimony of defendant Gary Scott Craw· 
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ford and the witness Boyd Erickson establishes that de-
fendant's vehicle was close enough to the intersection to 
constitute an immediate hazard, and the Erickson vehicle 
was already within the intersection when plaintiff made 
her left turn. In attempting to turn left plaintiff violated 
Section 41-6-73, Utah Code Annotated (1953) and was 
therefore negligent as a matter of law. Skerl vs. Willow 
Creek Coal Co., 92 Utah 474, 69 P2d 502 ( 1937). 
POINT II. 
THE GRANTING OF A MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT IS PROPER WHERE THERE IS NO GEN-
UINE ISSUE AS TO ANY MATERIAL FACT. 
Relying on the case of Singleton vs. Alexander, 19 
Utah 2d 292, 431 P2d 126 ( 1967), Plaintiff's brief argues 
that Summary Judgment in negligence cases should rarely 
be granted. Language is quoted from that decision sug-
gesting that Summary Judgment is more frequently grant-
ed in contract cases than in negligence cases. Nonetheless, 
Singleton vs. Alexander, supra, agrees that a motion for 
Summary Judgnfut is proper where there is no genuine 
issue as to any material fact, whether the case concerns 
contracts, negligence or any other type of legal problem. 
In a discussion of Summary Judgments under Rule 
56 Utah Rules of Civil Procedure the court has said: 
The primary purpose of the Summary Judgment 
procedure is to pierce the allegations of the plead-
ings, show that there is no genuine issue of mate-
rial fact, although an issue may be raised by the 
pleadings, and that the moving party is 1::ntitled 
to judgment as a matter of law. 
Rule 56 U.R.C.P. is not intended to provide a 
substitute for the regular trial of cases in which 
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there are disputed issues of fact upon which the 
outcome of the litigation depends, and it should 
be invoked with- caution to the end that liti-
gants may be afforded a trial where there exists 
between them a bona fide dispute of material fact. 
However, where the moving party's evidentiary 
material is in itself sufficient and the opposing 
party fails to proffer any evidentiary matter when 
he is presumably in a position to do so, the courts 
should be justified in concluding that no genuine 
issue of fact is present, nor would one be present 
at tral. 
Upon a motion for Summary Judgment, the courts 
ought to recognize, as a minimum, that the oppos· 
ing party produce some evidentiary matter in con· 
tradiction of the movant's case or specify in an 
affidavit the reason why he cannot do so. 
Dupler vs. Yates, 10 Utah 2d 251, 351 P2d 624 
(1960). 
In the case of Henry vs. W ashiki Club, Inc., 11 Utah 
2d 138, 355 P2d 973 0960), the defendant's motion for 
Summbary Judgment was granted by the trial court and 
affirmed by the Supreme Court. Plaintiff complained of 
injuries sustained when he fell down a dark stairway. 
In affirming the Summary Judgment the court said: 
We recognize the validity of the plaintiff's argu· 
ment that doubts should be resolved in favor of 
permitting one who has a grievance to present his 
claim to a court or jury, and that a Summary Judg· 
ment, which deprives him of that privilege, 
should be granted without reluctance. However, 
it does have a useful and salutary purpose. When 
the evidence as contended by the plaintiff, and 
every reasonable inference that fairly could be 
drawn therefrom, are considered in the light most 
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favorable to him, and it nevertheless appears that 
he could establish no right of recovery, the motion 
should be granted to save the time, trouble and 
expense involved in a trial. 
Although the courts are careful to preserve litigants' 
rights to have their claims ultimately decided by a trial, 
Summary Judgment may properly decide those claims in 
which the evidence shows there are no genuine issues as 
to a material fact. Here, the plaintiff admits that she 
failed to observe the approaching vehicle which collided 
with her car. She likewise concedes that she did not 
observe any northbound traffic, even the northbound ve-
hicle which stopped to avoid hitting her car. 
CONCLUSION 
The evidence and every reasonable inference which 
can fairly be drawn therefrom shows that plaintiff was 
negligent as a matter of law, which was a proximate 
cause of her damage, and the judgment of the Trial Judge 
should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
REX J. HANSON 
and ROBERT W. MILLER 
of Hanson, Baldwin, Brandt 
& Wadsworth 
Attorneys for Respondents. 
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